This paper considers matching problems with individual/regional minimum/maximum quotas. Although such quotas are relevant in many real-world settings, there is a lack of strategyproof mechanisms that take such quotas into account. We first show that without any restrictions on the regional structure, checking the existence of a feasible matching that satisfies all quotas is NP-complete. Then, assuming that regions have a hierarchical structure (i.e., a tree), we show that checking the existence of a feasible matching can be done in time linear in the number of regions. We develop two strategyproof matching mechanisms based on the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA), which we call Priority List based Deferred Acceptance with Regional minimum and maximum Quotas (PLDA-RQ) and Round-robin Selection Deferred Acceptance with Regional minimum and maximum Quotas (RSDA-RQ). When regional quotas are imposed, a stable matching may no longer exist since fairness and nonwastefulness, which compose stability, are incompatible. We show that both mechanisms are fair. As a result, they are inevitably wasteful. We show that the two mechanisms satisfy different versions of nonwastefulness respectively; each is weaker than the original nonwastefulness. Moreover, we compare our mechanisms with an artificial cap mechanism via simulation experiments, which illustrate that they have a clear advantage in terms of nonwastefulness and student welfare.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider a two-sided matching problem. In a standard two-sided matching problem, there are two types of agents, where one type called a student is matched to another type called a school. Multiple students can be matched to ✩ This paper is based on the authors' conference publication [9] . The difference between this paper and [9] is as follows. In this paper, we use a strictly more general model, in which regional minimum and maximum quotas co-exist, while Goto et al. [9] consider only regional minimum quotas. They developed two mechanisms, one is fair but wasteful, while the other is nonwasteful but not fair. Both mechanisms cannot handle regional maximum quotas. In this paper, we concentrate on fair mechanisms and develop two fair mechanisms, one of which can be considered as an extension of the fair mechanism developed in [9] . Table 1 DA-based mechanisms with regional quotas. * indicates our contribution, † indicates a special case that can be covered by our contribution. (KK: Kamada and Kojima [18] , BFIM: Biro et al. [2] , FITUY: Fragiadakis et al. [7] , GIKYY: Goto et al. [10] General regions NP-complete * a single school, and a school has an individual maximum quota: the number of students assigned to a school cannot exceed a certain limit. In this paper, we use the terms "students" and "schools" to represent agents in our model, but our results can obviously be applied to other two-sided matching problems, such as matching medical residents to hospitals, cadets to military branches, workers to firms, and so on. The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed. 1 However, many real-world matching markets are subject to more general distributional constraints. For example, school districts might need at least a certain number of students in each school to operate, as in college admissions in Hungary [2] , i.e., individual minimum quotas must be satisfied. Also, in the early 2000s, the United States Military Academy solicited cadet preferences over assignments to various branches and imposed minimum and maximum quotas on the number of students who could be assigned to each branch [25, 26] . Diversity constraints at schools can also be considered as a minimum quota problem, where students are divided into several types according to their socioeconomic status, and school districts impose a minimum quota for each type of students at each school. Furthermore, minimum/maximum quotas can be imposed on a set of schools (region) rather than on an individual school. One motivating example of this model is a hospital-resident matching problem. Assume a policy maker requires that a certain number of residents be assigned to hospitals on an isolated island. She also hopes to avoid an excessive concentration of residents in metropolitan areas. However, she does not want to interfere with how these residents are assigned within the hospitals on the island or in the metropolitan area. Table 1 summarizes the existing works related to regional minimum/maximum quotas. We assume that individual maximum quotas are requisite since virtually all existing works assume the existence of individual maximum quotas. 2 When considering regional quotas, we distinguish a special case where the regions have a hierarchical structure. When only individual maximum quotas are imposed, the standard Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA) [8] is widely used because it is strategyproof and stable. Since stability is decomposed fairness and nonwastefulness, DA is fair and nonwasteful. Also, regional maximum quotas, in which regions have a hierarchical structure, are considered in [2, 10, 18] . Individual minimum quotas are considered in [7] and two DA-based strategyproof mechanisms are developed. However, as shown in Table 1 , a number of interesting combinations remain unexplored, which we examine in this paper.
More specifically, we first analyze the complexity for checking whether a feasible matching (which satisfies all regional quotas) exists or not, when we put no restrictions on regions. We then prove that this problem is NP-complete. Since checking the existence of a feasible matching is intractable in general, we concentrate on a special case where regions have a hierarchical structure. As described in Table 1 , we consider the most general case in this setting, where each region and each individual school can simultaneously impose both minimum and maximum quotas.
A hierarchical structure is ubiquitous in any company, university, or military organization. When such an organization as a company allocates human resources, it is natural to assume that the obtained matching must satisfy the feasibility constraints at various levels in the organization hierarchy; each division, department, or section, has its own minimum/maximum quotas. Such feasibility constraints can naturally be represented by regional quotas.
We develop two strategyproof mechanisms based on the DA, which we call Priority List based DA with Regional minimum and maximum Quotas (PLDA-RQ) and Round-robin Selection Deferred Acceptance with Regional minimum and maximum Quotas (RSDA-RQ). These mechanisms are inspired by two existing mechanisms that can handle regional maximum quotas [10, 18] . We say a matching is fair if no school wants to replace a student matched to it with another student who prefers to be matched with the school. Also, we say a matching is nonwasteful if student s wishes to be assigned to school c but is not accepted, then there must be a plausible reason, i.e., moving s to c violates some maximum/minimum quotas. A matching which satisfies fairness and nonwastefulness is called stable matching. 3 When regional quotas are imposed, a stable matching may no longer exist, i.e., fairness and nonwastefulness are incompatible. PLDA-RQ and RSDA-RQ are fair, thus the matchings obtained by these mechanisms can be wasteful. We show that the two mechanisms satisfy different versions of nonwastefulness respectively; each is weaker than the original nonwastefulness. Moreover, we compare our mechanisms with an artificial cap mechanism (in which regional quotas are removed by imposing artificial caps so that the 1 See Roth and Sotomayor [24] for a comprehensive survey of many results in this literature. 2 If we set each individual quotas large enough, e.g., equal to the number of students, it becomes non-binding. Thus, we can represent a case without individual maximum quotas. 3 Technically, stability further requires individual rationality. However, in our environment where no agent is unacceptable, individual rationality is trivially satisfied. Based on this observation, we regard a stable matching as a fair and nonwasteful matching throughout the paper.
standard DA can be applied) via simulation experiments. Experimental results illustrate that our mechanisms have a clear advantage in terms of nonwastefulness and student welfare.
Related literature
There is substantial literature on two-sided matching [24] . In recent years, matching problems with some constraints have been broadly studied.
Kamada and Kojima [18] consider the residency matching problem in Japan, in which maximum quotas to regions (disjoint sets of schools) are imposed. They show that, with regional maximum quotas, a stable matching does not always exist, and propose a strategyproof mechanism that produces a matching that satisfies a weaker stability requirement. Goto et al. [10] also consider a matching problem with regional maximum quotas, and introduce another strategyproof mechanism that produces a matching taking schools' competition in each region into account. Fragiadakis et al. [7] study school choice problems where each school/college needs a certain number of students for operation, i.e., individual minimum quotas. Our work is based on [7, 10, 18] and extends their mechanisms to handle regional minimum/maximum quotas.
Motivated by the matching system for higher education in Hungary, Biro et al. [2] consider two kinds of college admission problems; one is with individual minimum quotas, and the other is with regional maximum quotas. In both cases, they show that a stable matching may not exist and checking the existence of the one is NP-complete. On the other hand, they prove that, if the regional structure is hierarchical and the colleges in the same region have identical priorities, a variation of the DA can find stable matchings with regional maximum quotas. However, we cannot use their mechanisms in our settings since we assume that schools have heterogeneous priorities and regional minimum quotas are imposed.
Monte and Tumennasan [22] consider the problem of assigning agents to different projects, where each project needs more than a particular number of agents. In this problem, each project does not have a priority over agents. Thus, this model can be regarded as an extension of the house allocation problem rather than the matching problem between two-sided agents. They develop a strategyproof serial dictatorship mechanism for this setting. However, this mechanism cannot handle regional quotas.
Also, in the literature of computer science, several generalizations of the standard stable matching have been proposed, and the complexity of checking the existence of a (generalized) stable matching has been discussed [16] . Huang [16] considers a hierarchical (laminar) system, which is different from our model. In [16] , each applicant (student) is matched with an institute (school), where the applicants are classified into subgroups called classes. Minimum/maximum quotas are imposed on classes, but no quota is imposed on groups of institutes. By contrast, in our model, each student is matched with a school, and groups of schools (regions) have minimum/maximum quotas. Fleiner and Kamiyama [6] extend the model in [16] to many-to-many matching cases. Hamada et al. [14] also study matching with minimum quotas in the hospitalsresidents problem, showing that minimizing the number of blocking pairs is an NP-hard problem when minimum quotas are imposed. Our setting is different from these existing works since we handle regional quotas, and our complexity result is on checking the existence of a feasible matching. Also, these works do not discuss strategy issues, which is one of main concerns in our paper.
Minimum quotas are also discussed in a controlled school choice program [4, 13, 19, 21] . However, models and theoretical properties in a controlled school choice program setting are quite different from the setting used in our paper. Kojima [19] considers a model where students are divided into two types, i.e., minority and majority, and shows that setting hardbounds for the number of majority students may hurt the minority students. To overcome this shortcoming, Hafalir et al. [13] propose soft-bounds for the number of minority students. Kominers and Sönmez [21] consider a model where each seat/slot of one school has a different priority ranking for students. This model can represent certain types of affirmative action and can be considered a generalization of the model in [13] . Ehlers et al. [4] generalize the model in [13] to cases where the number of student types can be more than two. Ehlers et al. [4] show several impossibility results when these minimum quotas are hard constraints. They obtain positive results when these minimum quotas are soft bounds. Westkamp [27] analyzes complex (maximum) quota constraints in the German university admissions system, while Braun et al. [3] conduct an experimental analysis of the same system. In our setting, students are not partitioned into different types. Thus, although minimum quotas are hard constraints, positive results have been obtained [7] .
We use the framework of matching with contracts due to Hatfield and Milgrom [15] . 4 They identify a set of conditions for key results in matching with contracts. More specifically, if the choice function of every school satisfies three conditions (i.e., substitutability, the law of aggregate demand, and the irrelevance of rejected contracts) then a mechanism called generalized Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism finds a "stable" allocation, and the mechanism is strategyproof for students. There are several recent works related to a general framework for handling various distributional constraints. Kojima et al. [20] propose a general framework that can handle a general class of constraints (represented by matroidal constraints and an M -concave function). Their framework provides an alternative method to [15] for proving the fact that the generalized DA is strategyproof. Although it is possible to apply their framework in our setting, we use a more familiar, standard framework based on [15] . Note that although Hatfield and Milgrom [15] and Kojima et al. [20] provide useful tool kits for proving that the generalized DA mechanism is strategyproof, developing a concrete mechanism that works for new types of constraints remains challenging; we need to appropriately design a choice function of schools so that their frameworks are applicable while the required design goals can be achieved. Goto et al. [11] present a general framework for handling more general class of constraints (beyond M -concavity). Their mechanism (called Adaptive DA) is strategyproof and nonwasteful, but not fair. In this paper, we concentrate on fair mechanisms. Our new mechanisms are not an instance of their mechanism. Kamada and Kojima [17] also provide a general framework for handling (hierarchical) regional maximum quotas. However, their model does not consider regional minimum quotas. When only regional maximum quotas exist, our RSDA-RQ mechanism can be considered as one instance of their mechanism. However, even in this case, our PLDA-RQ mechanism is not an instance of their mechanism. Yokoi [28] proposes another general framework, in which each school has a matroidal choice function, but without any distributional constraints between schools. In this paper, we consider a model where distributional constraints are imposed on a group of schools. Thus, we cannot apply the framework of Yokoi [28] to our model. We develop mechanisms that can directly handle regional quotas. An alternative approach is to artificially modify individual quotas so that all regional quotas can be automatically satisfied when individual quotas are satisfied. Then, we can apply any existing mechanisms that can handle only individual quotas. We call such a mechanism artificial cap mechanism. As long as artificial caps are determined independently from students' preferences, an artificial cap mechanism is strategyproof. Such a mechanism is used in the Japan Residency Matching Program, in which the capacities of hospitals in urban areas such as Tokyo are reduced so that more doctors will be forced to apply to hospitals in rural areas [18] . In Section 6, we show the advantage of our approach over the artificial cap mechanism.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first introduce a general model in which we do not put any restrictions on the regional structure. Next, in Section 3, we examine the complexity for checking the existence of a feasible matching for the general case and the hierarchical case. In Section 4, we describe the generalized DA mechanism and its properties. Then, Section 5 introduces our newly developed mechanisms. Next, Section 6 shows the advantage of our approach over the artificial cap mechanism via computer simulations. Finally, Section 7 concludes our paper.
Model
A market is a tuple (S, C , R, p, q, S , C , X, PL ). S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n } is a set of students, C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m } is a set of schools, and R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . .} is a set of regions, each of which is simply a set of schools r ∈ 2 C \ {∅}. We assume |R|, i.e., the number of regions, is polynomial in |C|, i.e., the number of schools. We assume each region has its minimum/maximum quotas, i.e., p = (p r ) r∈R and q = (q r ) r∈R are the regional minimum and maximum quota vectors, where 0 ≤ p r ≤ q r for all r ∈ R. When r consists of a single school c, p {c} /q {c} represent the minimum/maximum quota for individual school p c /q c . Each student s has a strict preference relation s over the schools, and each school c has an idiosyncratic strict priority relation c over the students. 5 The vectors of all such relations are denoted as S = ( s ) s∈S for the students and C = ( c ) c∈C for the schools. We assume that all schools are acceptable to all students and vice versa. Without this assumption, we cannot guarantee the existence of a feasible matching even if the number of students is large and the minimum quotas are small. 6, 7 We follow the model presented in [15] , where a student and a school are matched by a contract.
8 X = S × C is a set of all contracts, where (s, c) ∈ X represents a contract by which s is matched with c. A matching is expressed as a set of contracts X ⊆ X . For any agent a ∈ S ∪ C , X a denotes the set of contracts related to a in X . Let X r denote c∈r X c . PL is a serial order over X called priority list, which represents a tie-breaking order among contracts. The priority list should respect the priority ordering of each school, i.e., the following condition holds: (s, c) PL (s , c) holds iff s c s .
One simple and natural way to construct a priority list is to use the ranks of the students for each school and a tie-breaking ordering over schools. Let rank c (s) denote the rank of student s according to school c's priority ordering on students. To be more precise, if s is ranked k-th from the top in c's priority ordering, then rank c (s) = k. Let us assume the tie-breaking ordering is defined as c 1 → c 2 → . . . → c m . Given this tie-breaking ordering, we define each binary relation in priority list PL as follows: for any s, s ∈ S and any c i , c j ∈ C , (s, c i ) PL (s , c j ) holds if one of the following conditions holds:
• rank c i (s) = rank c j (s ) and i < j. 5 To be more precise, school c has a preference over sets of students. We assume c has a preference that is responsive with maximum quota q c [23] , which is obtained by the strict priority relation over students c . 6 This assumption is motivated by some real-life applications. For example, in many universities in Japan, an undergraduate student who majors in engineering must be assigned to a laboratory to conduct a project, and the project is required for graduation. In this setting, every student can be assumed to be acceptable to every laboratory and vice versa. Also, this assumption would be reasonable for a public school choice problem. In some other applications, e.g., a hospital-resident matching, this assumption might be too demanding. 7 Considering the worst-case, to guarantee that a student is matched to some school, a student must submit her complete preference ordering (complete list) of all schools. Nevertheless, assume student s is matched to school c when she submits a complete list. Then, if she submits an incomplete list, in which schools worse than c are removed, the obtained matching is the same. Thus, we can expect our proposed mechanisms would work fine with incomplete lists as long as the list is sufficiently long. 8 The model presented in [15] , a contract can contain other terms, e.g., wages or working hours, when matching a worker to a firm. Here, we assume a contract contains no other terms except the information of the related student/school.
In other words, for two pairs of (s, c) and (s c ), (s, c) PL (s , c ) holds if the ranking of s for c is strictly higher than that of s for c . If the rankings are the same, then the schools use tie-breaking ordering among schools. If there exists an organization or a consortium in which all hospitals are involved, it would be possible to agree on a more sophisticated method to generate a priority list.
We say X is school-feasible if ∀r, p r ≤ |X r | ≤ q r holds. We say X is student-feasible if ∀s, |X s | = 1 holds. Then, we say X is feasible if it is student-and school-feasible. Also, we say X is semi-school-feasible if there exists X ⊇ X such that X is school-feasible. We say a mechanism is feasible if it produces a feasible matching for every possible profile of preferences and priorities.
A mechanism is a function that takes a profile of students' preferences as input and returns a matching. We say a mechanism is strategyproof if no student ever has any incentive to misreport her preference, regardless what other students report.
We introduce several desirable properties of matchings and mechanisms.
Definition 1 (fairness).
Given feasible matching X , student s has justified envy toward
such that the following conditions hold: (i) c s c and (ii) s c s . We say that feasible matching X is fair if no student has justified envy. We say a mechanism is fair if it always obtains a fair matching.
In words, student s has justified envy when she would rather be matched to school c than her current match c, and she has higher priority at c than student s who is assigned to c .
Definition 2 (nonwastefulness).
Given feasible matching X , student s claims an empty seat of c , if there exists (s, c) ∈ X such that the following conditions hold: (i) c s c, and (ii) matching X , which is obtained from X by moving s from c to c , is feasible. More precisely, X is given as (X ∪ {(s, c )}) \ {(s, c)}. We say that feasible matching X is nonwasteful if no student claims an empty seat. We say a mechanism is nonwasteful if it always obtains a nonwasteful matching.
In general, fairness and nonwastefulness cannot coexist when minimum/maximum quotas are imposed (even if there exist no regional maximum/minimum quotas), i.e., there exists a case where no matching is fair and nonwasteful [4, 7, 18] , as shown in the following example. The priorities of schools are given as:
Here, c 1 is the least popular school for both s 1 and s 2 , but at least one student must be assigned to c 1 since p c 1 = 1. Let us introduce two conditions that are weaker than nonwastefulness.
Definition 3 (PL-nonwasteful).
Student s, who is assigned to c, claims an empty seat of c by PL in feasible matching X if:
A matching is PL-nonwasteful if no student claims an empty seat by PL. We say a mechanism is PL-nonwasteful if it always produces a PL-nonwasteful matching.
In words, the claim of student s for moving her from c to c is regarded as legitimate only when the priority list supports
Definition 4 (school-equitable-nonwastefulness).
Student s, who is assigned to c, school-equitably claims an empty seat
is school-equitably-nonwasteful if no student school-equitably claims an empty seat. We say a mechanism is schoolequitably-nonwasteful if it always produces a school-equitably-nonwasteful matching.
In words, the claim of student s is regarded as legitimate only when moving s from c to c strictly decreases the imbalance of students among these schools. 9 9 If minimum/maximum quotas of two schools are significantly different, requiring the balance between these schools might be meaningless. As discussed in [18] , we can modify the definition such that the deviation from a certain ideal distribution is minimized. To be more precise, we assume for each school c, its target quota q c is defined, and condition (iii) is modified as (
Assume in Example 1, the priority list is defined as: (s 1 , c 1 ) PL (s 2 , c 2 ) PL (s 1 , c 3 ) PL (s 2 , c 1 ) PL (s 1 , c 2 ) PL (s 2 , c 3 ) . This priority list is generated from schools' priorities and a tie-breaking ordering c 1 
is fair and PL-nonwasteful, since the claim of student s 2 to move her from c 2 to c 1 is not supported by the priority list. X is also fair and school-equitably-nonwasteful, since moving s 2 from c 2 to c 1 does not strictly decrease the imbalance among c 1 and c 2 .
PL-nonwastefulness and school-equitable-nonwastefulness are independent. A PL-nonwasteful matching can be not school-equitably-nonwasteful and vice versa. Let us consider the following example. 
Here, X = {(s 1 , c 1 ), (s 2 , c 1 )} is PL-nonwasteful since the claim of student s 2 to move her from c 1 to c 2 is not supported by the priority list, while it is not school-equitably-nonwasteful, since moving s 2 from c 1 to c 2 strictly decreases the imbalance among c 1 and c 2 . Assume the case where c 1 s 2 c 2 . Then, X = {(s 1 , c 1 ), (s 2 , c 2 )} is school-equitably-nonwasteful, since moving s 2 from c 2 to c 1 increases the imbalance among c 1 and c 2 , but it is not PL-nonwasteful since the claim of student s 2 to move her from c 2 to c 1 is supported by the priority list.
Let us introduce an alternative fairness requirement, which we call PL-fairness. This requirement is based on the underlining priority list. PL-fairness implies fairness.
Definition 5 (PL-fairness).
Given feasible matching X , student s has justified envy by PL toward s if there exist
We say that feasible matching X is PL-fair if no student has justified envy by PL. We say a mechanism is PL-fair if it always produces a PL-fair matching.
In words, student s has justified envy by PL in X if s prefers c over her current assigned school c, (s, c ) has higher priority than (s , c ) according to PL , and the set of contracts obtained by removing (s , c ) and adding (s, c ) is schoolfeasible. If we restrict our attention to the case where c = c , this definition becomes identical to Definition 1. Intuitively, PL-fairness means that if student s wants a seat of school c and student s wants a seat of school c , but giving these seats to both students will violate some quotas, then this competition must be settled based on the priority list.
Complexity of finding a feasible matching

General case
Given an instance of a market, the first question we need to answer is whether a feasible matching exists or not. In the model with only individual maximum/minimum quotas, this question is easy, i.e., it suffices to check whether c∈C p c ≤ n ≤ c∈C q c holds. However, by introducing regional maximum/minimum quotas, this question becomes hard, i.e., it becomes NP-complete.
Theorem 1. Given S, C , R, p, and q, checking whether a feasible matching exists or not is NP-complete. This holds even for the case
where ∀r ∈ R, |r| ≤ 3.
Proof. Clearly, for given matching X , checking whether it satisfies all quotas can be done in O (|R| · |C|). Thus, this problem is in NP.
To show that this problem is NP-hard, we reduce an arbitrary 3-SAT problem instance to a matching problem with regional maximum/minimum quotas. 3-SAT consists of set of boolean variables V and set of clauses L. Each clause l is a disjunction of three literals, each of which is either boolean variable x ∈ V or its negation ¬x, e.g.,
Now, for a given 3-SAT problem instance, we create an equivalent matching problem instance as follows. For each literal (i.e., x or ¬x), we create a school. A pair of x and ¬x forms a region, whose minimum/maximum quotas are 1. Also, for each l ∈ L, the schools in l form a region, whose minimum quota is 1. There are n students, where n = |V |.
Assume that there exists a feasible matching in this problem. Then, let us determine an instantiation of the variables as follows: if a student is assigned to x, x is TRUE (thus, ¬x is FALSE). If a student is assigned to ¬x, ¬x is TRUE (thus x is FALSE). Note that x and ¬x form a region, whose minimum/maximum quotas are 1. Thus, each student is assigned to either x or ¬x, but not both at the same time. Thus, the truth value of x is uniquely determined. Then, for each clause l, since its minimum quota is 1, at least one literal in l is TRUE. Thus, clause l is satisfied. Therefore, this 3-SAT instance is satisfiable. Also, if there exists no feasible matching, then, there exists no instantiation of the variables that satisfies all the clauses.
Thus, this 3-SAT instance is unsatisfiable. 2
Note that a regional maximum quota can be represented as a regional minimum quota and vice versa. For example, assume that there exists region r, whose minimum quota is p r . Then, we can replace it with complementary region r = C \ r, whose maximum quota qr = n − p r . This modified problem is equivalent to the original problem. Thus, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2. Given S, C , R, p, and q, checking whether a feasible matching exists or not is NP-complete. This holds even for the case where (i) there exist only maximum quotas, or (ii) there exist only minimum quotas.
Hierarchical case
Since checking the existence of a feasible matching is intractable in general, in the rest of this paper, we concentrate on a special case where regions are hierarchical.
10 A similar hierarchical model is used in [2, 18] .
Definition 6 (hierarchical region).
We say set of regions R is hierarchical if ∀r, r ∈ R where r = r , one of the following holds:
If set of regions R is hierarchical, we can construct a tree that represents R. We assume that C , which is the region that contains all schools, is included in R. We also assume C has non-binding minimum quota p C = n and maximum quota q C = n, where n is the number of students. Furthermore, we assume for each c ∈ C , {c} ∈ R, i.e., for each school c ∈ C , there exists a region that consists of a single school c.
Definition 7 (tree).
Tree T R for set of regions R is defined as follows: (i) root node C is the region that contains all the schools, (ii) leaf node {c} is a region that contains only one individual school c ∈ C , and (iii) for each node r ∈ R, where r = C , its parent node r ∈ R is a region that is the proper inclusion-minimal superset of r. Fig. 1 shows an example of a tree structure. Let children(r) denote a set of child nodes of r. For a leaf node, i.e., r = {c}, children(r) is ∅. It is clear that r = r ∈children(r) r holds for |r| > 1. We often use the terms "node" and "region"
interchangeably.
In contrast to the general case, in a hierarchical model, checking the existence of a feasible matching can be done in linear time, i.e., the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3. Given S, C , R, p, q, and T R , checking whether a feasible matching exists or not is solved in time linear in the number of nodes in T R .
Proof. A procedure for solving this problem can be described as follows. First, we revise p r in a depth-first manner so that 10 If we ignore computational costs and fairness, we can apply the strategyproof mechanism proposed in [11] when regions are non-hierarchical.
Similarly 
, and p C , q C = n holds at root node C , starting from the root node, we can divide n students into several groups and pass one group to one child, so that its regional minimum/maximum quotas are satisfied. By recursively doing this, we can find the assignments of all individual schools, which satisfy all minimum/maximum quotas.
It is obvious that this procedure finishes in time linear in the number of nodes in T R . 2
In the rest of this paper, we assume regions are hierarchical and
q r holds for all r ∈ R. Note that the tree in Fig. 1 satisfies this condition.
Generalized DA
In this section, we introduce a skeleton of a mechanism called generalized Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism [15] and its properties. This mechanism uses choice functions define the choice function of schools Ch C . As we discuss in the next section, our two mechanisms, PLDA-RQ and RSDA-RQ, can be expressed by the generalized DA with different formulations of Ch C . Formally, the generalized DA is defined as follows.
Mechanism 1 (generalized DA).
Here, Re is a set of rejected contracts. Students cannot choose contracts in Re. Initially, Re is empty. Thus, each student can choose her most preferred school. The chosen set by students is X . Then, schools choose X , which is a subset of X . If X = X , i.e., no contract is rejected by the schools, the mechanism terminates. Otherwise, the mechanism updates Re and repeats the same procedure.
Hatfield and Milgrom [15] define a notion of stability for a matching, which we call HM-stability in this paper.
11
Definition 8 (HM-stability). A matching X ⊆ X is said to be HM-stable if X satisfies (i)
Let X denote all HM-stable matchings. We say X ∈ X is the student-optimal HM-stable matching if all students weakly prefer X over any other matching in X .
For Ch C , we require that the following three proprieties hold.
Irrelevance of rejected contracts:
For any X ⊆ X and x ∈ X \ X , Ch C (X ) = Ch C (X ∪ {x}) holds if x / ∈ Ch C (X ∪ {x}). In words, this condition requires when adding x to X , if x is not accepted, then x does not affect the outcomes of other contracts in X .
Law of aggregate demand:
For any X , X ⊆ X with X ⊆ X , |Ch C (X )| ≤ |Ch C (X )| holds. In words, this condition requires that the number of accepted contracts weakly increases when more contracts are added. 11 Hatfield and Milgrom [15] as well as many others define stability in such a way that a block by a coalition that includes multiple students is allowed.
Such a concept is identical to our definition if the schools have substitutable preferences.
Substitutes condition: For any
In words, this condition requires that if contract x is rejected in X , then it is also rejected when more contracts are added to X .
Hatfield and Milgrom [15] show that if Ch C satisfies these three properties, the generalized DA is strategyproof, and the obtained matching is the student-optimal HM-stable matching. 12 To show that Ch C satisfies the above three properties, it is often convenient to use a property called single-improvement property, which was first proposed in [12] .
Definition 9 (single-improvement property).
We say Ch C satisfies the single-improvement property if for any X ⊆ X , x ∈ X \ X , one of the following conditions holds:
In words, the single-improvement property means, by adding contract x to X , the chosen set of contracts Ch C (X ∪ {x}) is unchanged, i.e., it is the same as Ch C (X ), or x is simply added to Ch C (X ), or x is added while single contract y is removed from Ch C (X ).
The following lemma holds.
Lemma 1. If Ch C satisfies the single-improvement property, it also satisfies the irrelevance of rejected contracts, the law of aggregated demand, and the substitutes condition. Thus, the generalized DA is strategyproof and obtains the student-optimal HM-stable matching.
Proof. From Definition 9, it is clear that for any X ⊆ X and
Thus, the irrelevance of rejected contracts holds. Also, from Definition 9, by adding new contract x, the size of the chosen set of contracts is weakly increasing. Thus, the law of aggregate demand holds. Furthermore, from Definition 9, if y ∈ X \ Ch C (X ), then y / ∈ Ch C (X ∪ {x}) holds. Thus, the substitutes condition holds. 2
Mechanism with regional minimum and maximum quotas
We first introduce a concept called expected minimum count, which is convenient for checking semi-school-feasibility.
Expected minimum count
In a DA-based mechanism, we need to check whether matching X is semi-school-feasible or not. In an existing work for handling minimum quotas [7] , minimum quotas are transformed into maximum quotas in order to check the semi-schoolfeasibility of X . To be more precise, minimum quota p r of r is transformed as maximum quota n − p r of r = C \ r, where n is the number of students. We assume X is semi-school-feasible if it satisfies all (i.e., original and transformed) maximum quotas.
However, when regional/individual minimum/maximum quotas coexist, we cannot apply this simple transformation method due to the interaction among these quotas. For example, let us consider the tree structure presented in Fig. 1 , but the maximum quota of c 1 is 4, and the minimum quota of c 2 is 2. There exist students s 1 , . . . , s 8 . Assume X = { (s 1 , c 1 ), (s 2 , c 1 ), (s 3 , c 1 ), (s 4 , c 1 ) }. X satisfies all of the original maximum quotas. Also, the individual minimum quota of c 2 is transformed into a maximum quota, which requires that the number of students assigned to schools except c 2 is at most n − 2 = 6. X satisfies this transformed maximum quota since the number of students assigned to schools except c 2 is 4 < 6. However, X is not semi-school-feasible. Since the regional maximum quota of {c 1 , c 2 } is 5, by assigning 4 students to c 1 , only one more student can be assigned to r, which is not enough to satisfy the minimum quota of c 2 . When regional/individual minimum/maximum quotas coexist, we need to consider the interaction among these quotas to check the semi-school-feasibility of the contracts.
We define an expected minimum count as follows.
Definition 10 (expected minimum count).
For matching X , the expected minimum count for each r, denoted by e r (X ), is defined as follows:
r ∈children(r) max e r (X ), p r otherwise.
Intuitively, e r (X ) represents the minimum number of students allocated to region r when all regions r r satisfy their minimum quotas. By this definition, for each region r, e r (X ) ≥ |X r | holds. Also, e r (X ) = |X r | holds iff all regions r r satisfy their minimum quotas. Furthermore, for any X , X ⊆ X , if X ⊆ X , then e r (X ) ≤ e r (X ) holds for all r ∈ R. 12 To be more precise, Hatfield and Milgrom [15] implicitly assume the irrelevance of rejected contracts throughout their analysis. Aygün and Sönmez [1] point this out and show that this condition is important for the conclusions of Hatfield and Milgrom [15] .
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 4. For a matching X ⊆ X, it is semi-school-feasible iff e r (X ) ≤ q r holds for all r ∈ R.
Proof. We first show if X is semi-school-feasible, then e r (X ) ≤ q r holds for all r ∈ R. By way of contradiction, assume X ⊇ X holds, where X is school feasible, but there exists r such that e r (X ) > q r . Since X is school-feasible, |X r | ≤ q r holds. Also, since X satisfies all minimum quotas, e r (X ) = |X r | holds. However, since X ⊇ X , |X r | = e r (X ) ≥ e r (X ) > q r holds. Such an X does not exist. This is a contradiction.
Next, we show if e r (X ) ≤ q r holds for all r ∈ R, then X is semi-school-feasible. We consider the following two cases: (i) |X | = n and (ii) |X | < n. In case (i), for all r ∈ R, |X r | ≤ e r (X ) ≤ q r holds. Since |X | = e C (X ) = n holds, all regions r C satisfy their minimum quotas. Thus, X is school-feasible. In case (ii), there exists at least one region r whose minimum quota is not satisfied yet. Then, we can find school c ∈ r and student s who is not assigned in X such that e r (X ∪ {(s, c)}) ≤ q r holds for all r ∈ R, by a similar argument used in the proof of Theorem 3. 2
In the previous example, e {c 1 ,c 2 } (X ) = 4 + 2 = 6 > 5 = q {c 1 ,c 2 } . Thus, X is not semi-school-feasible.
Priority list based deferred acceptance mechanism with regional minimum and maximum quotas
This subsection introduces a strategyproof mechanism called Priority List based Deferred Acceptance mechanism with Regional minimum and maximum Quotas (PLDA-RQ). This mechanism uses a similar idea to Goto et al. [10] , who develop a mechanism that can handle regional maximum quotas.
The choice function Ch C of PLDA-RQ is given as follows.
Definition 11 (choice function of schools Ch C (X ) of PLDA-RQ).
1. Initialize Y to ∅. PLDA-RQ is defined as one instance of the generalized DA mechanism in which Ch C is given as Definition 11.
The calculation of Ch C is a greedy procedure whose time-complexity is polynomial in |X | and |R|. Since Re monotonically increases in Mechanism 1, PLDA-RQ repeats at most O (|S| · |C|) rounds. Thus, its time-complexity is polynomial in |S| and |C|.
Example 3. Consider the tree structure presented in Fig. 1 . There are eight students, S = {s 1 , . . . , s 8 }.
The preferences and priorities are defined as follows: PL is generated by the rank-based method with tie-breaking ordering c 1 → c 2 → c 3 → c 4 .
In the first execution of Line 2 of Mechanism 1, each student chooses her most preferable contract, i.e., X is set to the following: c 4 ), (s 5 , c 4 ), (s 4 , c 4 ), (s 3 , c 4 ), (s 7 , c 1 ), (s 2 , c 4 ), (s 8 , c 1 ), (s 1 , c 4 ) (s 7 , c 1 ), (s 8 , c 1 ) are added to Y . Thus, we obtain X = X \ { (s 1 , c 4 ), (s 2 , c 4 ), (s 3 , c 4 ) }. Since X = X , we set Re to { (s 1 , c 4 ), (s 2 , c 4 ), (s 3 , c 4 ) } and repeat the procedure.
In the second execution of Line 2, each student chooses her most preferred contract that is not included in Re. X is set to the following: (s 1 , c 3 ), (s 2 , c 3 ), (s 3 , c 3 ), (s 6 , c 4 ), (s 5 , c 4 ) are sequentially chosen and added to Y . However, when (s 4 , c 4 ) In the third execution of Line 2, X is set to the following: c 3 ), (s 2 , c 3 ), (s 3 , c 3 ), (s 6 , c 4 ), (s 4 , c 1 ), (s 5 , c 4 ), (s 7 , c 1 ), (s 8 , c 1 ) In the fourth execution of Line 2, X is set to the following: c 2 ), (s 1 , c 3 ), (s 2 , c 3 ), (s 3 , c 3 ), (s 6 , c 4 ), (s 4 , c 1 ), (s 5 , c 4 ), (s 7 , c 1 ) }. Now, X is school-feasible and X = X . Thus, the mechanism returns this X as output, and terminates.
We show the properties that PLDA-RQ satisfies.
Lemma 2. The choice function Ch C of PLDA-RQ satisfies the single-improvement property.
Proof. For X ⊆ X and x = (s, c) ∈ X , let Preceding( X , x) denote {y ∈ X | y PL x} and Succeeding( X , x) denote {y ∈ X | x PL y}. When calculating Ch C (X ∪ {x}), it is clear that adding x does not affect the outcome of each contract in Preceding( X , x). Also, if x is not accepted, then adding x does not affect the outcome of each contract in Succeeding( X , x). Thus, if x is not accepted, Ch C (X ∪ {x}) = Ch C (X ), i.e., condition (i) in Definition 9, holds.
Assume x is accepted. If no contract in Succeeding(
condition (ii) in Definition 9, holds. (r, c ) ). Thus, the outcomes of z under X and X ∪ {x} must be identical. In conclusion, Ch C (X ∪ {x}) = (Ch C (X ) ∪ {x}) \ {y}, i.e., condition (iii) in Definition 9, holds. 2
Assume there exists contract
From Lemmas 1 and 2, we can immediately obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 5. PLDA-RQ is strategyproof.
Also, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 6. PLDA-RQ always produces a feasible and fair matching.
Proof. Assume X , which is the matching obtained by PLDA-RQ, is not feasible. By the definition of the generalized DA mechanism, X is semi-school-feasible. Thus, the only possibility that X is not feasible is that some student s is not assigned to any school. Since X is semi-school-feasible, we can choose contract x = (s, c) such that X ∪ {x} is semi-school-feasible. Then, it is clear that x ∈ Ch S (X ∪ {x}) and x ∈ Ch C (X ∪ {x}) hold. This contradicts the fact that X is HM-stable.
Assume X is not fair. 
From the incompatibility of fairness and nonwastefulness, PLDA-RQ is wasteful since it is fair. We can see in Example 3, s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 claim an empty seat of c 4 .
Theorem 7. PLDA-RQ is PL-nonwasteful.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume in matching X , which is obtained by PLDA-RQ, there exist (s,
hold. This contradicts the fact that X is HM-stable. 2
Theorem 8. PLDA-RQ is PL-fair.
Proof. Assume X , which is obtained by PLDA-RQ, is not PL-fair. Then, there exist (s, c ) ∈ X \ X , (s, c), (s , c ) ∈ X , such   that c   s c, (s, c ) PL (s , c ) , {(s, c )}) hold. This contradicts the fact that X is HM-stable. 2
Furthermore, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 3. Feasible matching X is HM-stable iff it is PL-fair and PL-nonwasteful.
Proof. We first show if X is HM-stable, then it is PL-fair and PL-nonwasteful. We already showed that HM-stability implies PL-fairness and PL-nonwastefulness in the proofs of Theorems 7 and 8.
Next, we show PL-fairness and PL-nonwastefulness implies HM-stability. By way of contradiction, let us assume feasible matching X is PL-fair and PL-nonwasteful, but there exists (s, c)
Since X is feasible, |X | = n. Also, Ch C satisfies the single-improvement property, there must be exactly one contract (s , 
Round-robin selection deferred acceptance mechanism with regional minimum and maximum quotas
This subsection introduces a strategyproof mechanism called Round-robin Selection Deferred Acceptance mechanism with Regional minimum and maximum Quotas (RSDA-RQ). This mechanism uses a similar idea to the Flexible Deferred Acceptance mechanism presented in [18] .
We assume a round-robin ordering of schools is defined. If the ordering is c 1 → c 2 → . . . → c m , c 1 is chosen first, c 2 is chosen next, and so on. After each of m schools are chosen, then c 1 is chosen again, then, c 2 is chosen again, and so on. In RSDA-RQ, the choice function of schools is defined as follows.
Definition 12 (choice function of schools Ch C (X ) of RSDA-RQ).
1. Initialize Y to ∅. 
Go to 2.
RSDA-RQ is defined as one instance of the generalized DA mechanism in which Ch C is given as Definition 12.
The calculation of Ch C is a greedy procedure whose time-complexity is polynomial in |X | and |R|. Since Re monotonically increases in Mechanism 1, RSDA-RQ repeats at most O (|S| · |C|) rounds. Thus, its time-complexity is polynomial in |S| and |C|.
Example 4. Consider the same setting as in Example 3. In the first execution of Line 2 of Mechanism 1, each student chooses her most preferable contract, i.e., X is set to the following:
where X is sorted according to the choice order in Ch C . (s 7 , c 1 ), (s 6 , c 4 ), (s 8 , c 1 ), (s 5 , c 4 ), (s 4 , c 4 ) In the second execution of Line 2, each student chooses her most preferred contract that has not been rejected by C , i.e., X is set to the following: c 1 ), (s 1 , c 3 ), (s 6 , c 4 ), (s 8 , c 1 ), (s 2 , c 3 ), (s 5 , c 4 ), (s 3 , c 3 ), (s 4 , c 4 ) }.
(s 7 , c 1 ), (s 1 , c 3 ), (s 6 , c 4 ), (s 8 , c 1 ), (s 2 , c 3 ), (s 5 , c 4 ), (s 3 , c 3 ) are sequentially chosen and added to Y . However, when (s 4 , c 4 ) is chosen, it is rejected since e {c 3 ,c 4 } (Y ∪ {(s 4 , c 4 )}) = 6 > 5 = q {c 3 ,c 4 } . Thus, we obtain X = X \ {(s 4 , c 4 )}. Since X = X , we set Re to Re ∪ {(s 4 , c 4 )} and repeat the procedure.
In the third execution of Line 2, X is set to the following: c 1 ), (s 1 , c 3 ), (s 6 , c 4 ), (s 7 , c 1 ), (s 2 , c 3 ), (s 5 , c 4 ), (s 8 , c 1 ), (s 3 , c 3 ) }.
All the contracts except (s 3 , c 3 ) are sequentially chosen and added to Y . Then, (s 3 , c 3 ) is rejected since e C (Y ∪ {(s 3 , c 3 )}) = 9 > 8 = q C . Thus, we obtain X = X \ {(s 3 , c 3 )}. We set Re to Re ∪ {(s 3 , c 3 )} and repeat the procedure.
In the fourth execution of Line 2, X is set to the following:
Now, X is school-feasible and X = X . Thus, the mechanism returns this X as output, and terminates.
We show the properties that RSDA-RQ satisfies. 
i.e., condition (ii) in Definition 9, holds.
Assume there exists contract y = (s , c ) ∈ Suc ∩ Ch C (X ) that is rejected, i.e., y / ∈ Ch C (X ∪ {x}). If there exist multiple rejected contracts, we choose the one that is examined earlier. Let X denote (X ∪ {x}) \ {x }, i.e., X is obtained by replacing x to x (if x = x , we assume X = X ). Since |X c | = |X c |, X c ⊂ Ch C (X ), and X c ⊂ Ch C (X ) hold, the outcomes of contracts related to other schools are the same between Ch C (X ) and Ch C (X ). (r, c ) ). Thus, the outcomes of z under X and X ∪ {x } must be identical. Then, Ch C (X ∪ {x }) = (Ch C (X ) ∪ {x }) \ {y} holds. Since we have X ∪ {x } = X ∪ {x} and Ch C (X ) ∪ {x } = Ch C (X ) ∪ {x}, Ch C (X ∪ {x}) = (Ch C (X ) ∪ {x}) \ {y}, i.e., condition (iii) in Definition 9, holds. 2
From Lemmas 1 and 4, we can immediately obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 10. RSDA-RQ is strategyproof.
Theorem 11. RSDA-RQ always produces a feasible and fair matching.
Proof. Assume that X , which is the matching obtained by RSDA-RQ, is not feasible. By the definition of the generalized DA mechanism, X is semi-school-feasible. Thus, the only possibility that X is not feasible is that some student s is not assigned to any school. Since X is semi-school-feasible, we can choose a contract x = (s, c) such that X ∪ {x} is semi-school-feasible. Then, it is clear that x ∈ Ch S (X ∪ {x}) and x ∈ Ch C (X ∪ {x}) hold. This contradicts the fact that X is HM-stable.
Also, let us assume (s , c) is the contract that has the lowest priority in X c according to c . Then, in the calculation of
holds. This contradicts the fact that X is HM-stable. 2
Unfortunately, as discussed in Kamada and Kojima [18] , Goto et al. [10] , fairness and school-equitably-nonwastefulness do not imply HM-stability. Thus, we cannot guarantee that RSDA-RQ obtains the student-optimal fair and school-equitablynonwasteful matching. In fact, there is a case where the student-optimal fair and school-equitably-nonwasteful matching does not even exist.
Evaluation
This section evaluates our newly developed mechanisms. We consider a market with n = 512 students and m = 64 schools. The individual maximum quota for each school q c is 32. Thus, for most cases, the individual maximum quota will not be a binding constraint. We consider two tree structures: binary tree and octary tree. In a binary tree, each node has two children. Since there are 64 leaf nodes, the height of the tree is six. In an octary tree, each node has eight children. Thus, the height of the tree is two, i.e., schools are divided into eight regions, each of which contains eight schools. Let a r denote p r − r ∈children(r) p r , i.e., a r is the increased amount of r's minimum quota compared to the sum of the minimum quotas of its children. Then, the regional minimum quotas are determined so that for each region r except C , a r becomes roughly the same. We set the sum of a r except C , i.e., r∈R\{C } a r , to 256. Similarly, let b r denote r ∈children(r) q r − q r , i.e., b r is the decreased amount of r's maximum quota compared to the sum of the maximum quotas of its children. Then, the regional maximum quotas are determined so that for each region r except C , b r becomes roughly the same. We set r∈R\{C } b r = 1024. We generate students' preferences as follows. We draw one common vector u c of the cardinal utilities from set [0, 1] m uniformly at random. We then randomly draw private vector u s of the cardinal utilities from the same set, again uniformly at random. Next, we construct cardinal utilities over all m schools for student s as αu c + (1 − α)u s , for some α ∈ [0, 1]. We then convert these cardinal utilities into an ordinal preference relation for each student. The higher the value of α is, the more correlated the students' preferences are. School priorities c are drawn uniformly at random. We create 100 problem instances for each parameter setting. 14 14 The averages and variances change only slightly when we increase the number of problem instances to 1000. For example, in Fig. 2 , when α = 0.8, for 100 problem instances, the average and variance of PLDA-RQ are 0.758 and 0.00104, respectively. On the other hand, for 1000 problem instances, they are 0.760 and 0.00102, respectively. We compare our mechanism to the Artificial Cap Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ACDA). In the ACDA, we artificially modify the individual maximum quota of each school so that all regional minimum/maximum quotas can be automatically satisfied once these quotas are satisfied. The ACDA produces a feasible and fair matching, but it is less flexible than our mechanisms.
First, we show the results when the individual minimum quota for each individual school p c is set to 0. Figs. 2 and 3 show the ratio of students who claim empty seats for binary/octary trees. The x-axis denotes the value of α, and the y-axis denotes the average ratio of the students who claim empty seats. The result reveals that the ACDA is quite wasteful; most students claim empty seats. The ratio is higher in the binary tree, in which regional quotas are more severe. In terms of efficiency, PLDA-RQ outperforms RSDA-RQ.
Figs. 4 and 5 illustrate the student welfare by plotting the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the average number of students matched with their k-th or higher ranked school under each mechanism for α = 0.3, and Figs. 6 and 7 show the results where α = 0.6. If the CDF of one mechanism first-order stochastically dominates another, then a strong argument can be made for using the stochastically dominant mechanism. PLDA-RQ and RSDA-RQ outperform the ACDA. Setting artificial caps decreases the welfare of the students, since the ACDA loses too much flexibility. As α increases, the competition among students becomes more severe and their welfare decreases. Our experimental results clearly show that our newly developed mechanisms have an advantage over the ACDA in terms of nonwastefulness and student welfare. In terms of efficiency, PLDA-RQ is better than RSDA-RQ. Thus, if the welfare of students is important, then PLDA-RQ would be a better choice. RSDA-RQ tries to balance the number of students allocated to each school by sacrificing the efficiency compared to PLDA-RQ. Thus, if such a balance is important, then RSDA-RQ would be a better choice.
Next, we show the results when the individual minimum quota for each individual school p c is set to 2 in Figs. 8-13. We can see the qualitative trends of these results are very similar to the cases when p c = 0. However, the difference between binary tree cases and octary tree cases becomes smaller. In octary tree cases where p c = 0, we can assign students to schools within a region very flexibly. By setting p c = 2, we lose such flexibility. As a result, the difference between the two different tree structures becomes smaller. Finally, we show the results when schools have different capacities in Figs. 14-19. We assume there are three types of schools: (i) small-scale schools where q c = 8, p c = 0, (ii) medium-scale schools where q c = 16, p c = 1, and (iii) large-scale schools where q c = 32, p c = 2. We set c 1 to a small-scale school, c 2 to a medium-scale school, c 3 to a large-scale school, c 4 is a small-scale school, and so on. For each region r except C , p r is set to 1.2 × r ∈children(r) p r , and q r is set to 0.9 × r ∈children(r) q r . The preferences of students and priorities of schools are generated in the same way as previous experiments. Again, we can see the qualitative trends of these results are very similar to previous experiments. In this setting, the difference between binary tree cases and octary tree cases is small, since we impose individual minimum quotas for large and medium scale schools.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the complexity of finding a feasible matching for a given matching problem with regional quotas. We showed that, when we put no restrictions on the structure of regions, checking the existence of a feasible matching that satisfies all quotas is NP-complete. Then, assuming that regions have a hierarchical structure, we developed strategyproof matching mechanisms for handling regional minimum/maximum quotas called PLDA-RQ and RSDA-RQ. We proved that these mechanisms are fair but wasteful, while they satisfy conditions that are weaker than nonwastefulness (i.e., PLwastefulness and school-equitable-nonwastefulness). In particular, PLDA-RQ satisfies a stronger fairness requirement called PL-fairness, and it obtains the student-optimal PL-fair and PL-nonwasteful matching. We then confirmed the advantages of these mechanisms compared to the artificial cap mechanism via simulations.
